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FOURTH AMENDMENT-PROTECTION
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: THE
INADEQUACIES OF USING AN
ANONYMOUS TIP TO
PROVIDE REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR
AN INVESTIGATORY STOP
Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990)
I.

INTRODUCTION

White, I

In Alabama v.
the United States Supreme Court held that
under the totality of the circumstances approach, an anonymous tip,
as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient
"indicia of reliability" to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary
tojustify an investigatory stop. 2 This Note explores the White opinions and concludes that the Court's decision seriously threatens the
constitutional right of the people of the United States to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. This Note argues that the
Court's application of the totality of the circumstances approach, as
opposed to the two-pronged test, inadequately protects privacy
rights. Furthermore, prior case law does not warrant the extension
of the investigatory stop doctrine to include nonviolent crimes, such
as possession of marijuana and cocaine. Finally, this Note argues
that even under the parameters set forth by the Court, its conclusion
that the details supplied by the informant were sufficiently corroborated to provide an indicia of reliability was abominable.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on April 22, 1987, Corporal B.H.
Davis of the Montgomery, Alabama Police Department received a
telephone call from an anonymous caller.3 The caller asserted that
Vanessa White would leave 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at
I 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
2 Id. at 2417.
3 Id. at 2414.
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a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken
right taillight lens, that she would go to Dobey's Motel, and that she
would possess approximately one ounce of cocaine inside a brown

attache case. 4 The informant did not reveal his or her identity to
Corporal Davis and was not known to have ever supplied information to the police department in the past.5 Furthermore, the inform6
ant gave no physical description of Vanessa White.
After receiving the telephone call, Corporal Davis and his partner, Corporal P.A. Reynolds, proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace
Apartments to set up surveillance on the 235 building.7 In the
building's parking lot, the officers located a brown Plymouth station
wagon with a broken right taillight lens.8 The officers observed a
woman leave the 235 building, carrying nothing in her hands, and
enter the brown station wagon. 9
The police officers followed the vehicle to Norman Bridge Road
where White took the most direct route to Dobey's Motel.' 0 When
the vehicle reached the Mobile Highway, on which Dobey's Motel
was located, Corporal Reynolds contacted patrol unit officers and
instructed them to stop the vehicle.I 1 The patrolmen stopped the
station wagon at approximately 4:18 p.m. in front of the jet Theater,
2
approximately 300 yards short of Dobey's Motel.'
As Corporals Davis and Reynolds approached the vehicle, they
observed that the car was full of clothes and that the driver appeared to be in the process of moving.' 8 Corporal Davis asked the
driver to step to the rear of the automobile, identified himself as a
police officer, and informed the driver that she had been stopped
14
because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle.
White assented to a vehicle search at Corporal Davis' request. 15
During the search, Corporal Reynolds found a locked, brown atId.
Brief for Respondent at 2, Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990) (No. 89-789)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
4
5

6

Id.

Id.
8 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2414.
9 Id.
10 Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 2-3.
11 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2414.
12 Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 3.
13 Id.
14 Id. The officers did not ask the driver to identity herself when they initially stopped
the car. The driver was not identified as Vanessa White during the investigatory stop.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 34.
15 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2415.
7
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tache case on the back seat. 16 Upon demand, White provided the
officers the combination to the lock. 17 Inside the attache case, the
officers found marijuana, empty plastic bags, and small manilla envelopes; they then arrested White.' 8 During processing at the station, the police officers found three milligrams of cocaine in White's
purse.19
White was charged in Montgomery County court with possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine. 2 0 Upon the trial
court's denial of White's motion to suppress the marijuana and cocaine, she pleaded guilty to the charges, but reserved the right to
21
appeal the denial of her suppression motion.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed
the conviction, holding that White's motion to suppress should have
been granted. 22 The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the State's
petition for certiorari. 23 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether an anonymous tip, as corroborated by
independent police work, may furnish the reasonable suspicion nec24
essary to justify an investigatory stop.
III.

BACKGROUND

The fourth amendment of the Constitution 25 protects "[tihe
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 26 After its
16 Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 4. At trial, Patrolman V.D. McMillon, the

officer who originally stopped White's vehicle, testified that when he stopped the station
wagon, he saw the attache case on the front seat next to the driver. Id. at 3.
17 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2415.
18 Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 3-4.
19 White, 110 S.Ct. at 2415. Although Corporal Davis testified that he saw White's
purse on the front seat of the vehicle, Patrolman McMillon testified that he did not see a
purse when he stopped the station wagon. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 3.
20 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2415.
21 Id.
22 White v. Alabama, 550 So. 2d 1074 (Ala. Grim. App. 1989). The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama held that the officers did not have the reasonable suspicion
necessary under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to justify an investigatory stop of
White's vehicle. The court concluded that the marijuana and cocaine were, therefore,
fruits of White's unconstitutional detention and that White's motion to suppress and
subsequent motion to dismiss should have been granted. White, 550 So. 2d at 1080.
23 Id. at 1081 (two justices dissented).
24 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2415.
25 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV.
26 This procedural safeguard has its historical origins in the American Revolutionary
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adoption in the Bill of Rights, the fourth amendment remained
largely unexplored by the United States Supreme Court for almost a
27
century.
In 1886, the Court, in Boyd v. United States,28 began to develop
the exclusionary rule, which has since become the primary focus of
fourth amendment decisions. 2 9 In Boyd, the Court linked together
the fourth and fifth amendments8 0 to create a fourth amendment
exclusionary rule, reasoning that "the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is [not] substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself."3 1
In the early twentieth century, the continued vitality of Boyd and
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule were cast into doubt by the
Court's decision in Adams v. New York. 3 2 In Adams, the Court dedared that "the weight of authority as well as reason" supported the
common law principle that courts should not inquire as to the
means by which evidence, which was otherwise admissible, was obtained. 3 However, the exclusionary rule was preserved to some extent by the Court's decision to distinguish Boyd, as opposed to
experience. "[I1t is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly
out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with England."
I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a), at

3 (2d ed. 1987) (quotingJ. LANDYNSKI,
(1966)) [hereinafter W. LAFAVE].

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19

supra note 26, § 1.1(a), at 5.
116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd has been characterized as "the leading case on the subject of search and seizure." See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925)). In
Boyd, the United States brought criminal charges against an importer of goods alleging
the use of fraudulent invoices to avoid payment of duties. The Boyd Court held that the
forced disclosure of a certain invoice violated the fourth amendment and, as such, the
items were inadmissible as evidence in the proceedings against Boyd. 116 U.S. at 638.
29 The exclusionary rule prohibits the fruits of an unreasonable search or seizure
from being admitted into evidence in a criminal case. W. LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 1.1(a),
at 5.
30 The fifth amendment provides in part, "nor shall [any person] be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. Many commentators have criticized this creative transfer of
the fifth amendment's expressly stated exclusionary rule to the fourth amendment. W.
LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 1.1(b), at 7.
32 192 U.S. 585 (1904). The Court concluded that papers which were improperly
seized by state officers while they were executing a warrant for policy slips and gambling
devices were admissible at trial. Id. at 597.
33 Id. at 594. The Court seemingly could have based its Adams holding on the fact
that the Constitution did not prohibit unreasonable searches under state authority, as it
did a few years later in National Safe Deposit v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914), as opposed to
creating the apparent conflict with Boyd. W. LAFAvE, supra note 26, § 1.1(c), at 7.
27 W. LAFAvE,
28
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34
overrule it.

The exclusionary rule was revived ten years after Adams in Weeks
v. United States.3 5 The Court held that to admit evidence which was
illegally seized by federal officers would, in effect, put a stamp of
approval on unconstitutional conduct.3 6 The Court stated that "[t]o
sanction [the unlawful invasion of one's home by officers of the law]
would be to affirim by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for
37
the protection of the people against such unauthorized action."
The Court concluded, therefore, that evidence illegally seized by
38
federal officers could not be used in a federal criminal proceeding.
Since the Bill of Rights was intended only as a limitation on the
federal government, it was settled early in American history that the
fourth amendment "[had] no application to state process." 3 9 However, with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment 4 ° in 1868, a
difficult issue arose regarding the relation of the limitation of the
fourteenth amendment upon the states to the limitations upon fed41
eral action in the first eight amendments.
Over the years, many of the first eight amendment guarantees
34 Adams, 192 U.S. at 597. The Adams Court distinguished Boyd by reasoning that the
papers in Adams were obtained through an incidental seizure made in the execution of a
legal warrant, and not through a forced disclosure of personal papers. Id. at 598.
35 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, police officers went to the house of the defendant
after he had been arrested without a warrant, searched the defendant's room, and took
possession of various papers found there, which were later turned over to a United
States Marshall. Id. at 386. Later in the same day, the Marshall went back to the room
and obtained additional papers. Neither the police officers nor the Marshall had a
search warrant. Id.
36 Id. at 394.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 398. The Weeks Court, however, did not require the same exclusion of the
fruits of the first search conducted by state officers, "as the Fourth Amendment is not
directed to individual misconduct of such officials." Id. In two subsequent cases, the
Court extended Weeks to preclude from admission in a federal criminal proceeding any
evidence which was illegally obtained either with federal participation, Bryars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (evidence of a crime discovered through state and federal
officer participation in an unlawful search was inadmissible against the victim), or for a
federal purpose, Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (liquor seized by state
officers making a warrantless search was inadmissible evidence in a federal proceeding
because the liquor was turned over to federal authorities immediately after its
discovery).
39 W. LAFAvE, supra note 26, § 1.1(d) at 9 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833), and quoting Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855)).
40 "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ..
" U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
41 W. LAFAvE, supra note 26, § 1.1(d), at 9. In other words, the issue became whether
the fourteenth amendment's extension of the due process requirement to the states also
extended the protection of the first eight amendments to state as well as federal actions.
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were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied to
the states. 4 2 Yet, the Supreme Court did not address the possible
extension of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure to the states through the fourteenth amendment
until 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado.43 The Wolf Court did not hesitate to
declare that "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
...is at the core of the Fourth Amendment... and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause." 4 4 Nevertheless, the Court refused to enforce the exclusionary rule against
the states. 4 5 For the next several years, evidence which was obtained in violation of the Constitution was used at state criminal
proceedings as long as it was notI obtained by "conduct that
46
[shocked] the conscience."
Approximately one decade later, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court
overruled Wolfand extended the exclusionary rule to state actions to
enforce fourth amendment violations. 4 7 The Mapp Court proclaimed that "[s]ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government." 4 8 The Mapp Court concluded that the exclusionary doctrine
42

Id. at 9-10.

43 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter framed the ques-

tion as follows:
Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the 'due process of law'
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted
at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it inadmissable in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the United
States because there [was] deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as
applied in Weeks v. United States... ?
Id. at 25-26.
44 Id. at 27-28 (evidence which was admitted at trial was obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment and would have been rendered inadmissable in a prosecution for a
violation of a federal law in a United States court).
45 Id. at 33. The Court reasoned that since the exclusionary rule was "not derived
from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment," had been expressly rejected
in 30 states, and was not followed in "most of the English speaking world," it was proper
to leave the victims of illegal state searches with private remedies. W. LAFAVE, supra note
26, § 1.1(d), at 10-11 (quoting Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28-31).
46 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, police officers had engaged in a series of unlawful acts, which concluded with the defendant forcibly being
given an emetic to retrieve drugs he had previously swallowed. The Rochin Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment required the exclusion of this evidence because it was
obtained by "conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172.
47 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The defendant had been convicted of knowingly possessing
and controlling certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs which had
been seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home by local authorities. Id. at
643.
48 Id. at 655. The Mapp Court went on to further reason that if the exclusionary rule
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49
as expressed in Boyd now extended to the states.
With the extension of this doctrine to the states, it became clear
that the courts would have to determine the constitutionality of a
common police practice frequently referred to as a "stop and
frisk." 50 The Court first addressed the stop and frisk issue in Terry
v. Ohio. 5 1 In Terry, the Court held that a police officer who reasonably detained someone because "criminal activity may [have been]
afoot" and who had reason to believe that "the person with whom
he was dealing may [have been] armed and ... dangerous" could
conduct a limited search for weapons to protect himself, even
though the officer may not have had probable cause to make an
arrest. 5 2 The Terry Court determined that the police officer's decision to stop and search the suspect was reasonable based upon the
police officer's personal observations. 53
The Court expanded on the limited holding of Terry in Adams v.
Williams, 54 delineating between the stop and the frisk portions of the

as established in Weeks did not apply to the states, "the assurance against unreasonable,
federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties." Id.
49 Id. at 666 (Black, J., concurring).
50 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 9.1, at 333 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter TREATISE]. A stop and frisk involves a police
officer stopping and searching a suspect, without his consent, in the absence of grounds
for arrest but with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be taking place. Id.
This practice was by no means a recent development of the 1960s. Id. at 334 (citing
NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS, FIELD SURVEYS V: A REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY
SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OFJUsTICE 327-36 (1967)). The stop and frisk had long been routine practice by almost
every major police force in the country. However, police actions in this regard generally
had low visibility and were largely disregarded before that time. TREATISE, this note,
§ 9.1(a), at 333.
51 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Tery, a police officer seized a revolver from the defendant
after the officer observed the unusual conduct of the defendant and two other men. The
officer, having concluded that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery,
stopped and frisked them. Id. at 4-7. The Terry Court held that the police officer could
stop and briefly detain the defendant for investigative purposes, because the police officer had reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may
[have been] afoot," even though he lacked probable cause under the fourth amendment.
Id. at 30-31. Teny was decided with two companion cases: Sibron v. New York and
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron and Peters presented related questions
under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, but arose in the context of the New York
stop and frisk statute. Id.
52 Teny, 392 U.S. at 30-3 1.
53 Id. The Teny Court subjected a frisk subsequent to a stop to constitutional scrutiny and determined that forcible street encounters could be undertaken if "reasonable"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. A balancing of the governmental and
citizen interests involved in the case determined the reasonableness of the search. Id. at
22. The Tery Court did not analyze the stop issue. Id. at 19.
54 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Williams, a person known to a police officer informed him
that an individual in a nearby automobile possessed narcotics and had a gun at his waist.
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encounter. 55 This decision further broadened the Terry standards
by allowing reasonable suspicion to be established not only by personal police observation, but also by information received from a
known informant. 56 The Williams Court asserted that when an informant is the source of the police officer's "reasonable cause for a
stop,"5 7 the informant's tip must have an "indicia of reliability."58
The consequence of the Court's decision to allow a known informant's tip to provide the grounds necessary for an investigatory
stop was the increasing use, by police officers, of anonymous informants for the same purpose. The Court has determined that information from an anonymous informant may establish probable cause
for an arrest.59 However, the Court has not considered whether an
anonymous tip may furnish the reasonable suspicion 60 necessary for
an investigatory stop. In the context of probable cause, the Court
has recently overruled the use of the two-pronged test 6 ' in favor of a
totality of the circumstances approach 62 to determine the reliability
The officer approached the vehicle, tapped on the window, and after the person rolled
down the window, removed from the person's waistband a loaded revolver which was
not visible from outside the car. Id. at 144-45. The Williams Court held that the informant's tip carried enough indicia of reliability to characterize both the police officer's investigatory stop and his subsequent actions as reasonable because they constituted a
limited intrusion designed to insure his safety. Id. at 149.
55 Id. Williams represented the first time that the Court recognized that any on the
street investigatory stop by the police was a forcible stop subject to fourth amendment
limitations. Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAuv. L. REv. 50, 173 (1972) [hereinafter Note, 1971 Term].
56 Williams, 407 U.S. at 147.
57
58

Id.

Id. at 146-47. The Williams Court stated that the tip had an indicia of reliability
because the informant was known to the police officer, had provided him with information in the past, the information was verifiable at the scene, and the informant herself
would have been subject to arrest for making a false complaint had the information
proven incorrect. Id.
59 Probable cause is the standard required to make an arrest. Teny, 392 U.S. at 22. It
is also the standard by which a magistrate determines whether to issue a warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (affidavit of police officer seeking a search warrant
had an anonymous letter from an informant attached which indicated a certain fact pattern would occur, culminating in a drug-buy by the defendants). See also infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
60 Reasonable suspicion is the standard required to make an investigatory stop.
Teny, 392 U.S. at 22. See also infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
61 The Court developed the two-pronged test in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), to determine whether an informant's tip established probable cause for an arrest. The two-pronged test requires a
determination of the following: first, whether the informant is generally trustworthy
(i.e., his or her veracity or reliability); and second, whether he or she obtained his or her
information in a reliable manner (i.e., the basis of his or her knowledge). Williams, 407
U.S. at 157. See infra notes 68-69 for further discussion of Aguilar and Spinelli.
62 The Court developed the totality of the circumstances approach in Gates, 462 U.S.
at 238. This approach involves using veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge not as
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63
of such anonymous tips.

IV.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the majority, 64 Justice White held that under the
totality of the circumstances approach, the anonymous tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient "indicia
of reliability" to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the investigatory stop.6 5

The majority followed Illinois v. Gates,66 which abandoned the
"two-pronged test" 6 7 of Aguilar v. Texas 68 and Spinelli v. U.S. 69 in
favor of a "totality of the circumstances" approach 70 for determin71
ing whether a known informant's tip established probable cause.
The Court recognized, however, that the Gates Court had made clear
that certain aspects of the two-pronged test, specifically an informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge," remained
72
highly relevant in determining the value of the informant's report.
While recognizing that the Gates Court asserted that an anonymous tip, standing alone, seldom sufficiently demonstrates an informant's basis of knowledge or veracity, 73 the majority determined
rigid requirements, but as closely intertwined elements which aid in the common sense
determination of an informant's reliability. Id. at 230.
63 Id. at 238.
64 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined Justice White.
65 Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417 (1990).
66 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates, the Supreme Court held that the two-pronged test
was overly rigid, and that the better, more flexible "totality of the circumstances" approach was the proper test. Id. at 238. See supra note 59 for a further discussion of Gates.
67 See supra note 61 for a discussion of the two-pronged test.
68 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar, a search warrant obtained from a magistrate
based upon an affidavit which stated only legal conclusions drawn from whom the affidavit referred to as "a credible person," was held insufficient, because the magistrate was
not informed of any of the underlying circumstances upon which the legal conclusions
or the informant's credibility were based. Id.
69 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli, the Court explicated the principles set forth in
Aguilar. The Spinneli Court held that a search warrant obtained from a magistrate, based
upon an FBI affidavit which stated mainly that a "reliable informant" told the FBI that
the defendant, who was "known" to the FBI as a gambler, presently was bookmaking,
was insufficient because the affidavit did not provide information to the magistrate upon
which he could independently judge both the informant's reliability and the reliability of
the information itself. Id.
70 See supra note 62 for a discussion of the totality of the circumstances approach.
71 Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990).
72 Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).
73 Gates, 462 U.S. at 237. The Gates Court argued that ordinary citizens generally do
not provide extensive recitations as to the basis of their everyday observations and that
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that in the instant case, as in Gates,more than just the anonymous tip
itself was available. 74 The Court argued that the anonymous tip, in
75
both cases, had been corroborated by police investigation.
While the Court acknowledged that the tip was not as detailed,
and the corroboration not as complete as in Gates, it contended that
"the required degree of suspicion was likewise not as high." 76 The
probable cause standard applied by the Gates Court required a
higher degree of suspicion than the reasonable suspicion standard
77
required in the instant case.
Explaining the reasonable suspicion standard, Justice White referred to U.S. v. Sokolow, 78 in which the Court had previously discussed the relationship between reasonable suspicion and probable
cause:
The officer [making a Terry stop] ...must be able to articulate something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch.'" The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal level of
objective justification' for making the stop .... We have held that
probable cause means 'a probability that contraband . . . will be

found,' and the level of suspicion required for a Tetiy stop is obviously
less demanding than for probable cause. 79
The majority further explained that reasonable suspicion is a lessdemanding standard than probable cause, not only because the former can be established with information that is different in quantity
or content, but also because reasonable suspicion can arise from
less reliable information than that which is required to show probable cause. 8 0
the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips was "by hypothesis largely unknown,
and unknowable." Id.
74 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989). In Sokolow, a drug courier profile case, the Supreme Court
held that Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents had the requisite reasonable
suspicion to detain the defendant because (1) he paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets
from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he travelled using a name that did not match the name under
which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source
city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round trip
flight from Honolulu, his departure city, to Miami had taken 20 hours; (5) he appeared
nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. Id. at 1583.
79 White, 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (quoting Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1585). Sokolow in turn
quoted Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 238 (1984), and Gates, 462
U.S. at 238. In Delgado, the Court held that Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) agents did not "seize" employees when the agents conducted factory surveys pursuant to a warrant to determine whether any illegal aliens were present as employees,
because the employees were free to leave the site and not to answer any questions. 466
U.S. at 219.
80 White, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. Justice White argued that this proposition was set forth
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Further, the Court proffered that reasonable suspicion, like
probable cause, depends on both the quantity of information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability.8 1 It concluded that,
applying the totality of the circumstances approach under the reasonable suspicion standard, as with the probable cause standard, a
tip with a relatively low degree of reliability can establish the requisite quantum of suspicion or cause if the tip contains sufficient infor82
mation to counteract the deficiency of reliability.
Finally, the Court gave credit to the concept proposed in Gates
that an informant who is able to predict future actions of a third
party probably is correct about other alleged facts concerning that
party, including a claim that the party is engaged in criminal activity.8 5 Applying the totality of the circumstances approach to the
case before it, the majority concluded that the anonymous tip, as
corroborated by the police investigation, exhibited sufficient indicia
of reliability to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify
84
the investigatory stop of White's vehicle.
B.

THE DISSENI-NG OPINION

Writing the dissent,8 5 Justice Stevens protested that under the
majority's ruling, "[a]nybody with enough knowledge about a given
person to make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge
against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like
the one predicting Vanessa White's excursion."8' 6 Justice Stevens
contended that millions of people depart from their apartments at
approximately the same time each day carrying an attache case and
heading for a destination known to their neighbors.8 7 He argued
further that the neighbors usually do not know what the attache case
contains.8 8 He concluded that an anonymous neighbor's prediction
about someone's departure time and probable destination is anyin Williams, where the Court assumed that an unverified tip from a known informant,
which had been held sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory stop, might not have
been reliable enough to establish probable cause. Id. (citing Williams, 407 U.S. at 147).
81 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416.
82 Id. Justice White based this conclusion on the Gates Court's application of the
totality of the circumstances approach in a probable cause situation in which the Gates
Court had given the anonymous tip the weight which it deserved in light of its indicia of
reliability as established through independent police investigation. Gates, 462 U.S. at
245-46.
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.

White, 110 S.Ct. at 2417.
Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
White, 110 S. Ct. at 2418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2417 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1991]

ANONYMOUS TIPS

thing but a reliable basis for assuming that the person is in possession of an illegal substance.89
In addition, Justice Stevens asserted that under the majority's
holding, "every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned by
any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was
based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer
just observed." 90 Although he acknowledged that the majority of
police officers would not adopt such a practice, he also recognized
that the fourth amendment was intended to protect citizens from
"overzealous and unscrupulous" officers as well as from those who
are "conscientious and truthful." 9 ' Justice Stevens determined that
the majority's decision made a mockery of the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 92
V.

ANALYSIS

The majority decision seriously threatens the constitutional
right of the people of the United States to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. When an informant's tip provides the reasonable suspicion needed to make an investigatory stop, "the
information [must carry] enough indicia of reliability to justify the
[police] officer's forcible stop."9 3 The Court's use of the totality of
the circumstances approach for determining the reliability of an
anonymous informant's tip in this reasonable suspicion context inadequately protects individual privacy rights. The two-pronged test
better guarantees the dependability of such a tip and, therefore, is
the proper methodology to apply. Moreover, the Court's extension
of the investigatory stop doctrine to include not only dangerous
crimes but also possessory crimes expands the scope of this doctrine
far beyond its original purpose. Finally, even under the parameters
set forth by the majority, the Court's conclusion in the instant case
that the details supplied by the informant were sufficiently corroborated to provide an indicia of reliability is abominable.
A.

TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH VERSUS TWOPRONGED TEST

The Court blindly advocated the totality of the circumstances
89 Id. at 2417-18 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did not cite any case law in
the dissent.
90 Id. at 2418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
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approach, 94 as opposed to the two-pronged test, 95 as the proper
methodology for determining the reliability of an anonymous informant's tip under the reasonable suspicion standard without considering the effects of this decision on fourth amendment rights. 96
By extending the totality of the circumstances approach from
the probable cause to the reasonable suspicion context, the Court
opened the door to police fabrication. Justice White's analysis that
the factors which are relevant for a determination of probable cause
based upon an informant's tip 97 "are also relevant in the reasonable
suspicion context although allowance must be made in applying
them for the lesser showing required to meet that standard" was
oversimplified. 98 He failed to comprehend that the opportunity for
police fabrication is much greater when applied to a reasonable suspicion standard.
To issue a warrant under the probable cause standard, a neutral
magistrate must make an independent determination based upon
the information which he or she received from a police officer who,
in turn, may have allegedly received the information from an informant. This action is taken before the suspect is stopped or
searched. On the other hand, to make a warrantless stop under the
reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer, who allegedly received a tip from an informant, independently makes the determination of whether the information provides the reasonable suspicion
necessary to make an investigatory stop.
Although the police officer's determination should be made
prior to the warrantless stop, application of the totality of the circumstances approach to reasonable suspicion does not adequately
foreclose the possibility of police fabrication of an alleged informant
after an unjustifiable police stop has yielded incriminating evidence. 9 9 Any unscrupulous police officer who is prepared to com94 Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1982). See supra note 62 for a discussion of the totality of
the circumstances approach.
95 See supra note 61 for a discussion of the two-pronged test.
96 The fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable search and seizure requires, under most circumstances, that search or arrest warrants be issued by a neutral
magistrate. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). In Gates, a magistrate's use of
the two-pronged test for a determination of probable cause based upon an anonymous
informant's tip was overruled in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach. 462
U.S. at 238.
97 The factors to which Justice White referred included those of the two-pronged
test: an informant's veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge. Alabama v. White,
110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990).

98 Id. He cited no authority and gave no reasoning for this determination.
99 This point is underscored by Judge Friendly's strong suggestion in his Williams
dissent that the police officer had fabricated the story of the unidentified informant,
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mit perjury can testify that a warrantless stop was based on an
anonymous informant's tip predicting whatever conduct the police
officer just observed. A court could then determine that the totality
of the circumstances approach was fulfilled, because the informant's
tip was corroborated by independent police investigation, even
though no informant ever existed. Indeed, the problem of post hoc
police fabrications, especially in narcotics cases, is neither minute' 00
nor solved by the totality of the circumstances approach.
As compared to the totality of the circumstances approach, use
of the two-pronged test significantly reduces the likelihood of police
fabrication. The two-pronged test guarantees not only that the informant has a reliable basis for his or her knowledge, but also that
he or she is trustworthy. 0 1 Requiring proof of a basis of knowledge
helps eliminate the possibility of police fabrication by forcing a disclosure of pertinent information concerning the tip. Without requiring an informant's basis of knowledge, the assertion of criminal
activity "stands no better than the oath of the officer to the same
effect."' 0 2 Moreover, requiring proof of an informant's basis of
knowledge is necessary; otherwise, a reliable informant could be
getting information from an unreliable source or basing information
upon a hunch.
Furthermore, in order to safeguard privacy rights, the information received by a police officer from an informant must be reliable.
To determine the reliability of the information, the trustworthiness
of the informant must be guaranteed. This assurance protects the
right of innocent individuals to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures by guarding against undependable tips. Since the totality of the circumstances approach does not guarantee the presence of both of these elements, and the two-pronged approach
because the story of the informant did not arise until the second suppression hearing.
Note, 1971 Tem, supra note 55, at 179-80 (citing Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d
Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
100 Note, 1971 Tem, supra note 55, at 179-80 (citing, e.g., Kuh, In-field Interrogation:
Stop, Question, Detention, and Frisk, 3 CalM. L. BuLL.597, 604 (1967); Younger, The Perjury
Routine, 3 GruM. L. BuLL. 551 (1967); Note, Police Perjuy in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A
New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. LJ. 507 (1971)).
101 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964); Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410
(1969). The two-pronged test requires that an officer have specific facts on which to
base conclusions-first, that the informant is telling the truth, and second, that the informant has obtained the information in a reliable way.
102 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 424 (White, J., concurring). Justice White continued, "Indeed,
if the affidavit of an officer, known by the magistrate to be honest and experienced,
stating that gambling equipment is located in a certain building is unacceptable, it would
be quixotic if a similar statement from an honest informant were found to furnish probable cause." Id.
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does, the latter better protects against police fabrication, thereby
preserving the privacy rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
Justice White's reasoning behind not requiring a demonstration
of both an informant's basis of knowledge and trustworthiness, but
allowing the strong presence of one to compensate for the nonexistence of the other, is logically flawed. Justice White properly asserted that "[r]easonable suspicion... is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability." 10 3 However, attempting to assert some support for the reliability of the anonymous tip, he argued that taking into consideration
the totality of the circumstances, "if a tip has a relatively low degree
of reliability, more information" can compensate for such an inadequacy and still provide the requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.104
Justice White did not consider that quantum of information and
degree of reliability are two distinct concepts. The fact that reasonable suspicion is a less burdensome standard than probable cause
should only allow a police officer to make an investigatory stop on a
lesser quantum of information rather than on information which he
or she received in a less reliable manner.' 0 5 By using this illogical
reasoning, Justice White established a standard under the totality of
the circumstances approach that allows a police officer to stop almost anyone, thereby severely limiting the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable search and seizure.
B.

INVESTIGATORY STOP FOR POSSESSORY CRIMES

In addition to refusing to impose any significant limitation on
the power of a police officer to make a warrantless stop based upon
an anonymous informant's tip, the Court implicitly rejected another
potential limit on the police power to initiate street encounters. By
applying the investigatory stop doctrine to a possessory crime situation, the Court eradicated much of the fourth amendment protection afforded by the Constitution. By not addressing this issue, the
Court appeared to dismiss the widely supported view that the power
to make a warrantless stop should be restricted according to the na103 White, 110 S.Ct at 2416.

104 Id. Justice White's position on this issue appears to contradict his argument in
Spinelli that to issue a warrant based upon information received from an informant, the
informant's basis of knowledge should be required in order to establish the tip's reliability. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 424 (White, J., concurring). See supra note 102 and accompanying text for a further discussion ofJustice White's concurring opinion in Spinelli.
105 Note, 1971 Term, supra note 55, at 178.
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ture of the crime under suspicion. 10 6
The power to make an investigatory stop is derived from Terry
v. Ohio.10 7 The Terry Court explicitly limited its holding to permit a
police officer making a reasonable investigatory stop to conduct a
frisk incident to the stop only to protect himself or herself.10 8 This
holding was premised on the condition that the police officer had
reason to believe that the suspect was armed and dangerous.10 9
By including nonviolent crimes within the scope of the Terry
doctrine, the Court expanded the investigatory stop doctrine far beyond its original intent. -Possessory crimes, such as possession of
marijuana and cocaine, do not necessarily involve the same degree
of danger to the police officer as do crimes of violence. The dissent
in Williams enunciated the worry of such an expansion, profoundly
stating that if Terry is extended "to crimes like possession of narcotics .... There is too much danger that, instead of the stop being
the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse
will be true." 1 10
Several commentators have indicated that police stop and frisk
powers are most often abused in narcotics possession investigations. 1 1' Moreover, warrantless stops or on-the-street frisks are not
considered to be of significant value to the general enforcement of
narcotics laws. 112 Hence, to extend the police power to stop to an
area such as possession of narcotics where it is not valuable, though
often abused, is illogical.
Justice White failed to address the extension of investigatory
stops to the arena of possessory crimes effectuated by the majority's
decision. If he had, however, he would likely have cited to Adams v.
Williams as precedent for such an extension. 113 However, the Williams Court extension of the Terry doctrine to incorporate a suspected possessory crime can be distinguished by the fact that the
106 Id. at 180 (citing, e.g., Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d. 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Friendly, J., dissenting)). Judge Friendly's dissent is quoted by Justice Brennan in Williams, 407 U.S. at 151-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and is cited by Justice Douglas in
Williams, 407 U.S. at 149 (Douglas, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting).
107 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra note 51 for a discussion of Terry.

108 Id.

109 Id.
110 Williams, 407 U.S. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams, 436 F.2d at
38-39 (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
111 Note, 1971 Term, supra note 55, at 180 (citing, e.g., Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 551 (1967); Note, Police Pejuyy in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility
Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971)).
112 Note, 1971 Term, supra note 55, at 180-81 (citations omitted).
113 See supra notes 54 and 58 for a discussion of Williams. The majority in Williams also
did not address the issue of extension to possessory crimes.
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informant in that case told the police officer that the suspect had a
gun;11 4 the officer had "reason to fear for his own ... safety." 115
The Terry doctrine "was meant for the serious cases of imminent danger or of harm recently perpetrated to persons or property,
not the conventional ones of possessory offenses." ' 1 6 The decision
by the majority ignores the fact that the Terry Court begrudgingly
accepted the necessity for a limited exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. The Court's decision "treat[s]
this case as if warrantless searches were the rule rather than the 'nar1 17
rowly drawn' exception."
Each exception to the warrant requirement makes it more likely
that innocent persons will be stopped and searched, retracting from
the privacy rights afforded by the fourth amendment. Certain situations, such as the safety of police officers, dictate that the warrant
requirement be displaced. In making this exception for possessory
crimes, however, the Court was not cognizant that innocently taking
away steps such as these may lead, one by one, to the irretrievable
impairment of the substantial liberties upon which this nation was
8
founded. 1
C.

CORROBORATION OF DETAILS

Even if the Court's totality of the circumstances approach and
expansion of the investigatory stop doctrine are accepted and applied to the facts in the instant case, the majority's conclusion that
the details supplied by the informant were sufficiently corroborated
to provide an indicia of reliability was unfathomable.
Justice White properly recognized that an anonymous tip, such
as the one received by Corporal Davis, "standing alone, would not
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [a stop] was
appropriate.' "119 However, Justice White incorrectly asserted that
the tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion. He attempted to justify the relatively small amount of detail
in the tip and incompleteness in the corroboration, as compared to
114 Williams, 407 U.S. at 145.
115 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
116 Williams, 407 U.S. at 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 154 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall had previously stated in his
dissenting opinion, "The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)).
118 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983).
119 Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1900) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).

1991]

ANONYMOUS TIPS

77

Gates, by proffering the difference between the degrees of suspicion
20
required in the cases.'
The informant's tip in the instant case lacked detail, and the
information which the tip contained was not sufficiently corroborated to demonstrate that the informant had special familiarity with
the affairs of the suspect. The tip contained no description of
White,' 2 1 and the officers failed to identify positively the driver during the investigatory stop. 1 22 The informant indicated that White
would carry a brown attache case as she left the building, but she did
not.' 23 The officers did not corroborate White's time of departure124 or the fact that she left from apartment 235-C.125 Finally,
the destination was insufficiently corroborated.' 26 Justice White
evaded the Gates holding, which required a much more detailed tip
accompanied by complete corroboration, by erroneously declaring
that the tip was sufficiently corroborated.
Furthermore, the lenient standard developed by the majority
allows for absurd consequences. According to this standard, any individual with sufficient information about another person could
have that person harassed by formulating a tip and reporting it to
27
the police.'
The instant case is merely an example of a vaguely corroborated anonymous tip consisting mostly of easily ascertainable details. As Justice Stevens argued in dissent:
Millions of people leave their apartments at about the same time every
day carrying an attache case and heading for a destination known to
their neighbors. Usually however the neighbors do not know what the
briefcase contains. An anonymous neighbor's prediction about somebody's time of departure and probable destination is anything but a
reliable basis for assuming that the commuter is in possession of an
illegal substance-particularly when the person is not even carrying
120 White, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. Once again, this justification is grounded in Justice
White's improper belief that reasonable suspicion allows a lower degree of reliability to
accompany the lesser quantum of information. See supra note 59 for a further discussion
of Gates.
121 White v. State, 550 So. 2d 1074, 1079 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
122 Id. In fact, the officers had no way of knowing the driver was actually White until
she was arrested and processed.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 33.
126 Id. at 34.
127 Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2418 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically Justice Stevens said, "Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to
make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able
to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa White's excursion." Id.
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the attache case described by the tipster. 128
Justice White tried to minimize the shortcomings of this anonymous
tip by indicating that the anonymous caller was able "to predict
[White's] future behavior."' 12 9 However, when the future behavior
concerns common activities, the tip does not "demonstrate inside
information," but only perhaps an observant informant.
Because the strongest advocates of the fourth amendment
rights against unreasonable search and seizure are frequently
criminals, it is easy to forget that interpretations of such rights apply
to the innocent and guilty alike. 3 0° By expanding the police power
to make a warrantless stop to a situation where such easily predicted
details are sufficient to supply the requisite reasonable suspicion,
the Court diminished the rights of all citizens "to be secure in their
3
person."'1
VI.

CONCLUSION

The majority failed to guarantee the reliability of the anonymous tip by blindly extending the totality of the circumstances approach from the probable cause to the reasonable suspicion context,
thereby eradicating individual privacy rights. The two-pronged test
is the more acceptable standard by which to judge the reliability of
information received from an anonymous informant, because it better assures the dependability of the information. The Court's expansion of the investigatory stop doctrine to include nonviolent
crimes further diminishes the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure by making warrantless stops the rule rather than
the exception. The Court's conclusion that the corroboration of the
easily predicted details was sufficient to justify the investigatory stop
exemplifies the leniency of the standard set forth by the majority.
This current standard seriously threatens the fourth amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
ORRIN S.

SHIFRIN

128 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 2417-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2417.
130 U.S. v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
131 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

